"...the oil conspiracy theory is honestly one of the most absurd when you analyze it."-Tony Blair“It [the invasion of Iraq] has nothing to do with oil; literally nothing to do with oil.”-Donald Rumsfeld"I'm saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil." -Alan Greenspan I. Introduction The Iraqi Constitution primarily reflects the interests of the US, and to a lesser extent the Iraqi elites who cooperated with it in writing the text. The United States will be able to exert a great deal of influence over any political process within the government or social institutions it has set up and is violently attempting to impose on Iraq. Thus, many Iraqi elites see collaboration with the US as a way to preserve or enhance their political power and prestige. In return for their service, the US will secure their positions at the top of its sponsored political order. This also means that the US will have the ability, to a large extent, to bend the outcomes of internal processes to meet its goals and interests. For Washington, the realization of vital strategic goals requires preventing independence from US domination, the likely result of any real democracy, using whatever means are deemed necessary and feasible. Democracy is thus the primary threat to the success of US policies, to be crushed if possible.
The imperative of preserving US dominance, and the authority of its allied elites, means that policy will strive not to resolve, but rather to manage the historical grievances of and conflicts between each of the sectarian parties to the advantage of the US and its Iraqi collaborators. The composition of the Iraqi Constitution, an element of internal policy, confirms this argument. In the pages that follow, I shall proceed to consider the Constitution in two ways. First, it needs to be placed in the proper context, amidst an ongoing occupation by the United States, which maintains an informal global empire based on control of capital and resources and its unrivaled military dominance. It therefore follows that US interests are not limited to any one country, region, or continent. This reality influences US policy toward each individual regional system, and thus each of the states and other political actors within them. Iraq is no exception; in order to understand policy there, we must take into account the global concerns of the US empire. Secondly, I will consider the internal implications of its enactment, including how it addresses the historical identities and tribulations of the Iraqi people.
II. Goals and Interests: US Objectives in IraqTo proceed, we must identify the “goals and interests” of the principal agent in the Iraqi Constitutional process, the US. To do so, we turn to the record of recent history. In 2002, the United States lunged at Iraq in a desperate attempt to preserve its rapidly declining global hegemony using military force, the one realm in which it was still the undisputed master. In doing so, it wished to establish a new norm in international relations by affirming its ability and willingness to wage unilateral “preventive” war – a war of aggression – against any nation it deemed a threat to its global hegemony, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy.1 To ensure success, the United States had to attack a country which posed virtually no threat of mounting serious resistance. With Iraqi civil society destroyed by a decade of “genocidal” US sanctions, as UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Baghdad Dennis Halliday put it, it seemed there would be little risk in an attack on that country.2 As Secretary of State Al Haig told Ronald Reagan when advising him to launch what became a decade-long campaign of terror throughout Central America, it had to be “one we can win,” a demonstration of the brutality with which we will crush even the smallest of offenders to the global order we have envisioned.
Not only was the United States attempting to intimidate others into conforming more closely with its imperial designs, it sought to secure a dependent client regime that would house stable military bases in the heart of the world's remaining energy resources. These bases could project US power throughout the Middle East, the chief energy-producing region. A constant supply of cheap energy is needed to power the economies of industrial capitalist countries; those with the ability to grant or deny access to such supplies are thus able to exert a significant amount of control over international relations. Control of Iraqi oil, the second largest proven reserves on the planet, would enhance significantly the strategic power and influence of the US. By gaining control of global energy supplies, as opposed to merely preserving access, the US places its hand on the spigot that fuels the economies of a large portion of the industrial capitalist world, granting it “veto power” over the actions of others, as postwar planner George Kennan put it.3 Given that the global system is less subject to US domination than it has been in the past, with the economies of India and China growing at breakneck speed and placing massive new demands on dwindling oil resources, this strategic goal becomes even more imperative. If the Iraq war were to succeed, the United States would extend what Zbigniew Brzezinski called its “critical leverage” over its major rivals in the developing tripolar world, Europe and Asia.4 This “veto power” or “critical leverage” is crucial to the US goal of maintaining permanent world dominance it described in its 2002 National Security Strategy.
In fact, these principles are deeply ingrained in US institutions. It was clear soon after the US entry into World War II that it would emerge as the dominant power in the postwar world. Sparked by this observation, extensive planning began in 1939, carrying on until 1945, between the State Department and Council on Foreign Relations to craft a new international order in which the US would “hold unquestioned power.”5 In 1945, the State Department determined that the oil reserves of the Gulf region constitute “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in history.”6 Roosevelt Administration “oil czar” Harold Ickes advised the President that the “Middle East presented an important key to postwar economic problems and to basic international political arrangements,”7 in other words, the whole of the international power structure. The ability of the United States – through corporations protected by state policy – to seize control of a large portion of global energy resources in the wake of the destruction of World War II, including the vast Saudi reserves, had a large hand in catapulting that state into its present position of global leadership.
There should never have been any serious doubt that these were the primary reasons for the US invasion, or for its current efforts to maintain Iraq as a dependent client state. Like most acts of aggression, the invasion of Iraq was routinely portrayed as an act of self-defense against an ominous and threatening enemy, and guided by noble and selfless objectives. Bush's “freedom agenda” was unveiled in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy on November 6, 2003, one year after the invasion and after it had become embarrassingly obvious that Iraq was not a threat to the United States and had no weapons of mass destruction, contrary to repeated official assertions. It takes tremendous faith in power to assume that simply because our leaders have announced their vision for a democratic Iraq, after the collapse of earlier official pretexts, they mean it. Regardless, following the “doctrine of good intentions” whereby the goals of often brutal US policies are always benevolent, the media trailed happily along, faithfully parroting official declarations and refusing to question or allow debate of official motives. As a result, many have been blinded to the nature and purpose of US policy in this critical region of the world.
In contemplating the “doctrine of good intentions,” we can first observe that good intentions, however defined, are not properties of states. Policy is made primarily in the interests of dominant economic sectors; in today's world, that means powerful multinational corporations. It is only natural that those who control a society's resources should have their hands firmly clasped on the levers of power; as a result of their disproportionate command of resources, these elites exert maximum influence on and benefit the most from the current global economic order. It should come as no surprise, then, that the policy decisions of ruling western elites are fundamentally judgements of the interests of the global capitalist system, as well as the maintenance of their position at the head of it. It would be extraordinarily difficult to define such motivations as benevolent or selfless. If we are to believe the assertions of our leaders, then we must also believe that the United States would have invaded Iraq if it were an island in the middle of the Indian Ocean whose main export was pickles instead of petroleum.
It is also useful to consider the course that a democratic Iraq would be likely to pursue. For one, it would be inclined to maintain the nationalized state of its oil and other natural resources, rather than exposing them to ownership by US investors. Additionally, a democratic and thus undoubtedly Shi'a-dominated Iraq could possibly resume its efforts to strengthen ties with Iran, while genuine moves towards liberty and justice in Iraq could lead to similar demands from the bitterly oppressed Shi'a population in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, where most of the oil is concentrated. In a nightmare scenario for Washington, an informal Shi'a dominated region comprising Iraq, Iran, and the important, oil-producing regions of Saudi Arabia could form on top of two thirds of the remaining oil resources, independent of western control. Of course, arming a truly democratic Iraq also raises the potential of a threat to Israeli hegemony, the principle regional antagonist and important US client. Iraq could even move to produce WMD as a deterrent from substantial Israeli stockpiles. Any of these possibilities would be intolerable to Washington, and would obviously be avoided at all costs.
Any remaining doubts about the true intentions of US policy in Iraq should be resolved by the Declaration of Principles signed between President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki in November of 2007.8 Under the Declaration, US troops may remain in Iraq indefinitely, in order to provide “security,” and to “deter foreign aggression.” The source of the “foreign aggression” to which the agreement refers is probably Iran. While official government pronouncements make it clear that Washington wishes to confront Iranian influence, Iranian aggression remains a highly unlikely circumstance. As for the former, it is understood by all that there would be no thought of providing “security” for a government that refuses to act in the interests of the US. Furthermore, the Declaration states that the United States will help in “training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces” to assist in the efforts of the US military to impose the political order of Washington's choosing, partly embodied in the Iraqi Constitution. Washington has ensured that it will retain control of the Iraqi Security Forces by training combat units, but not logistics and support units. A March 2007 report by the Government Accountability Office found that “without qualified logisticians and communications specialists, reliable vehicles and equipment, and accepted policies and procedures, the Iraqi forces cannot achieve the self-sufficiency upon which the drawdown of Coalition forces depends.”9 Without the necessary training in these key areas, the Iraqi Security Forces may provide bodies for combat, but they will remain dependent on the US forces for direction and supplies.
In the agreement, the United States also threatens military action to crush any attempt to “impede, suspend, or violate” the constitution, in which crucial US interests are enshrined. When the “rule of law” rises from this constitution, it will be firmly based on foundations which allow the US to achieve its key policy aims, including provisions protecting foreign ownership of resources and property (except real estate). If the reference to the constitution was not sufficient, the Declaration specifically commits the Iraqi state to “encourage the flow of foreign investments to Iraq, especially American investments.” This clause in the Declaration of Principles pledges military “assistance” to Iraq against any attempt to change or suspend the right of foreign companies to take over the Iraqi economy, even if this threat comes from the Iraqi people. Such concerns as the will of the majority cannot be taken into account in a properly functioning democracy; rather, the state must be run in the interests of wealthy western investors. To the United States, the writing of the Iraqi Constitution was a chance to legitimize this domination, entrenching it in the very legal foundations of the Iraqi state.
The Pentagon is also continuing to build massive military bases all around the country, funded by the Democrat-controlled Congress, which also pays for the construction of the city-like US “embassy” in Baghdad, unlike any other embassy in the world. These behemoths are not being built to be abandoned or destroyed. Leaked versions of the future “Status of Forces Agreement,” which would complement the “Declaration of Principles” include allowing the maintenance of “more than 50 US military bases, full control of Iraqi airspace, legal immunity for US military and private security firms, and the right to conduct armed operations throughout the country without consulting the Iraqi government.”10 While this agreement is an obvious display of contempt for democracy in Iraq, it is equally so for democracy in the United States, as the administration has decided that this “Status of Forces Agreement” does not constitute a treaty, and thus does not have to be voted on by Congress.
The agreement bears remarkable similarity to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which allowed the British to maintain Iraq as a client despite the veneer of sovereignty created by instating Iraq in the League of Nations in 1932. While it “placed all authority for internal order in Iraq on the king,” Iraq allowed Britain to maintain military basing rights for the RAF and the right to move British troops through Iraqi territory at any time the British deemed necessary. The “independent” Iraqi army would be fully armed, supplied, and advised by the British, maintaining its dependence on its imperial master for direction. Despite the fact that the British had put in place an Iraqi constitution, parliament, and elections, Iraq was still “unmistakably” a British “imperial project, corresponding in its shape and in its constitution to ideas current in Great Britain about the proper organization of power and about the specific conditions that would enhance its own interests in the Middle East.” Despite the proclamation of formal Iraqi independence by the League of Nations in 1932, “British influence continued” just “as visible as before.”11 The terms of the treaty meant that “most of the British advisers and officials” stayed at their posts, “training the Iraqi army, and the RAF retaining control of the bases at Habbaniyya and Shu'aiba.” Furthermore, “British-owned companies were as conspicuous as ever in all the major sectors of the economy and British influence on the king and his ministers remained strong.” While Iraq was “formally sovereign,” it “could not easily escape British influence”; in particular, “Iraq's foreign policies would not be allowed to run counter to perceived British interests.”12 Change a few names and dates, and the parallel to present day affairs is all too clear.
The imperial will of the United States was expressed with even greater clarity in President Bush's signing statement to HR 4986.13 President Bush has continued to use signing statements, despite the assertion of the conservative National Bar Association and many others that they represent a clear violation of the Constitution, as part of larger efforts to concentrate unprecedented power into the hands of the executive. In the statement, issued on January 28, 2008, the President declared that he will ignore Congressional legislation that interferes with the establishment of “any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq,” or inhibits state and corporate moves “to exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq.” Even more brazen than the Declaration of Principles, the statement again reveals the outrageous contempt for democracy which has characterized Bush policies. In short, Washington has expressed its intentions with unusual clarity: Iraq should remain a client state, allow permanent US military bases, permit the US military to conduct combat and air operations freely, and ensure that US corporations are free to take control of its vast resource wealth.
III. The Writing and Imposition of the ConstitutionThe Bush administration has described the Iraqi Constitution's protections of personal freedoms and liberties as “among the most far-reaching of any in the region and probably around the world,” an assertion Middle East legal expert Nathan Brown writes “cannot survive even a quick glance at other constitutions.”14 The “skeletal” Iraqi constitution “concentrate[s] far more on naming freedoms rather than developing firm structural guarantees to protect them,” Brown says.15 Most rights named in the constitution are subjected to implementing legislation. For example, article 38 provides “surprisingly weak” protection of “very basic freedoms,” such as freedom of expression, the press, public meetings, and peaceful demonstration, “insisting that these rights not harm morals and the public order.”
Even “critical structures,” such as the supreme court, one whole house of parliament, the judicial council, and the human rights commission are only “mentioned in a very general way,” leaving it up to the assembly to implement these measures as it wishes – or not. Emergency rule, a constitutional provision frequently abused by governments around the world to attain authoritarian powers, is mentioned, “but almost completely undefined,” a very dangerous situation for Iraqis seeking to be rid of the despotism which has characterized the entirety of their country's political existence. As “skeletal” as the Iraqi constitution is in unimportant areas such as protections for the human rights of the Iraqi people, it is quite clear in those places where it counts most to US policy, as we shall see.
To the United States, the Iraqi Constitution represented an ideal opportunity to program the Iraqi government to act reliably within its interests, discussed above, structurally limiting the decision space of the Iraqi government well into the future on terms set by the US. Like the British in 1918, the US began by running the country directly, through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the leadership of Paul Bremer. Bremer proceeded to enact “a shock program” of economic liberalization, described by the Economist as “the wish list of foreign investors.”16 These measures transformed “Iraq's battered economy abruptly into a free-trade zone.” Under Bremer's economic program, the US enacted laws that gave foreign investors equal rights with Iraqis in the domestic market, allowing foreign ownership of 100% of Iraqi assets, permitted the full repatriation of profits, instituted a flat tax, abolished tariffs, institute strict intellectual property rights, sold off a wide range of state-owned companies, opened the banking system to foreign investment, reduced much-needed fuel and food subsidies to the struggling population, and privatized many of Iraq's social services, such as health, education, and water delivery.17 Of the $1.5 billion in private contracts awarded by the CPA, 74% went to US firms and only 2% to Iraqi contractors, with “little competitive bidding.”18 While this inequity triggered protest from wide sectors of the Iraqi public, including the business class, the measures were designed to stay in place long after Bremer departs. As a US official in Iraq put it to the Washington Post, it would "not be easy to reverse" the orders, no matter the will of the population.19
Throughout the process of crafting a new legal order for Iraq, the US attempted to lock in policies that protect and advance fundamental US interests, both by codifying them into law and by strengthening those Iraqis who will agree to defend them long after the period of direct rule ends. A large part of that interest is opening up Iraq's economy to takeover by foreign investors, which of course will seriously limit Iraq's sovereignty and inhibit its development, one of the clearest lessons of economic history. Before the the attack even began, the US had assembled exile groups that would support the invasion, tolerate the presence of US troops, and defend free-market policies. Just as the 1920 revolt forced the British to accommodate the rising Iraqi resistance to its direct rule and establish a more “acceptable form of government in Iraq” in the form of an “appointed council of ministers working under British supervision,”20 resistance to authoritarian direct US rule grew, and so there was little choice but to create the appearance of greater Iraqi involvement in the process. This was accomplished by instating the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), whose members were handpicked by the US and many of whom had “long-established links with the US administration.”21 The major task assigned the IGC was to write Iraq's transitional constitution, with the help and advice of an American legal team to ensure that the laws enacted under direct CPA rule would remain in effect.22 In March 2004, the IGC approved the final draft of the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL).23
In November 2004, to appease the continually increasing resistance of the Iraqi people to US occupation and rule, the US announced that it would hand “sovereignty” to an appointed interim government whose Prime Minister and other officials were to be essentially chosen by the United States; the Prime Minister was longtime CIA asset Iyad Allawi.24 The appointed government would oversee the elections for the transitional Parliament, which would then elect the committee which would draft the final constitution. Equally importantly, the new government would have to fully support the use of extreme violence by the US in crushing the Iraqi resistance movement, which was beginning to get out of control. To facilitate US repression, Allawi declared martial law across Iraq in November 2004 and turned a blind eye to US bombardment of concentrated population centers, such as the ten-day bombing campaign of the city of Falluja which included the occupation and closure of the hospital, a war crime, and the use of cluster munitions, leaving an estimated 5,000 dead, including many women and children.25
Grateful for his cooperation, during the elections for the first Iraqi parliament in January 2005, the US conducted extensive covert and overt operations to support the candidacy Allawi, including expelling the popular and independent news network Al Jazeera from Iraq on spurious grounds, granting Allawi significant television time on US-controlled outlets and pouring money into his campaign. This campaign, designed to limit the seats attained by the coalition of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Islamic Dawa Party, failed, with Allawi's secular list winning a mere forty seats. The United Iraqi Alliance, comprised of both SCIRI and Dawa, won 140 of the seats in the assembly that would draft the Iraqi constitution. Eventually, SCIRI and Dawa leaders proved malleable to US demands anyway, protecting US interests in oil, privatization, and the presence of US soldiers. The Iraqi government, of course, still depends on US soldiers to enforce its authority regardless of who wins the elections.
The main task facing this government was to write Iraq's permanent constitution. Not long after the “transfer of sovereignty,” on June 30 2004, the Iraqi newspaper Al Mada published what was at the time the most recent draft of the Iraqi constitution, being negotiated by the group of US-backed Iraqi leaders appointed to do the job.26 According to the draft, Iraq's vast oil wealth would be used to provide every Iraqi with a quality education, healthcare, housing, and a plethora of other social services. Furthermore, all of Iraq's natural resources would be owned collectively by the Iraqi people, while the state would be legally bound to find employment opportunities for everyone. Even the Iraqi elites cooperating with the US wanted an Iraq very different from that which Bremer and the CPA had sought to build. It seemed that their definition of democracy, that the will and welfare of the people is the primary concern of the state, and the people have the right to decide how their resources are allocated, differed from that of the US.
To “fix” the June 30 draft, clearly unacceptable from the US standpoint, the United States dramatically increased its involvement in the constitutional process. Reuters described US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad as being a “ubiquitous presence,” while the Financial Times said he played a “big role in the negotiations.”27 Khalilzad's approach to the talks was described by a State Department official as “intensive diplomacy.”28 This may have been putting it mildly; at one point, Khalilzad and his team of American diplomats offered the Iraqi negotiators their own proposed version of the constitution.29 According to the Washington Post, the diplomats supporting Khalilzad were working from a Kurdish party headquarters “to help type up the draft and translate changes from English to Arabic for Iraqi lawmakers,” a very telling sign of the degree of control the US had over the process.30
Iraqis from each sectarian group complained about the lack of power they were being allowed in crafting the governing document for their supposedly sovereign nation. Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of the constitutional committee, said “the Americans say they don't intervene, but they have intervened deep. They gave us a detailed proposal, almost a full version of a constitution.” In Othman's view, the US was “being governed by their domestic agenda,” which they pushed through in Iraq by meeting individually with specific lawmakers in backroom meetings. “It's not right and it's counterproductive,” continued Othman, “if they have something to say, why don't they come out and address the whole committee?”31 One of the closest US allies among the Iraqi leadership, Nechirvan Barzani, also expressed his grievances to the press. “The US and UK are working behind the scenes,” he said, “dealing with all the groups, saying it should be like this and like that.”32 An anonymous Shi'ite member of the constitutional committee said “we haven't played much of a role in drafting the constitution. We feel that we have been neglected. We have not been consulted on important issues.”33 Similarly, a Sunni negotiator concluded that “this constitution was cooked up in an American kitchen, not an Iraqi one.”34
After the process was completed on August 28, the text was radically different from the June 30 version.35 Most of the language which focused on social justice and equality, with an economy regulated by the state which guaranteed Iraqis public services was taken out, replaced with clauses protecting private property, foreign investment, the rights of capital, and encouraging privatization and deregulation. The nature of the changes made to the June 30 draft are highly revealing of the power the US held during the drafting process, and worthy of consideration. Article 5, which proclaimed that “social justice is the basis of building the society,” and Article 17 which laid out the basis for a progressive tax system, stating that “the basis for taxes and public expenditures is social justice,” have both been removed. Article 18, also deleted, suggested a strong role for the state in providing services for the struggling population and limited the role of private capital in Iraqi society:
1)The basis of the economy is social justice. It is composed of cooperating between public and private activity. Its goal is economic growth in accordance with a decreed plan and the realization of prosperity for citizens.
2)The state shall bear the responsibility for growth, developing production and services, building a solid infrastructure for the economy of the country, and providing services.
In their place is Article 25, which specifically instructs the state to protect the private sector, and opens the door for the takeover of the Iraqi economy by foreign investors:
The state shall guarantee the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance with modern economic principles to insure the full investment of its resources, diversification of its sources and the encouragement and development of the private sector.
By “reform” it is doubtless that the authors were referring to the usual bill of neoliberal economic “reforms,” also known as the “Washington consensus,” consisting of cutting spending on social programs, selling off state assets at fire-sale prices to wealthy foreigners, deregulating the market and eliminating all devices which would inhibit total foreign economic takeover. Instead of eliminating the neoliberal economic policies of the CPA and Paul Bremer, the new Iraqi Constitution would make the Iraqi state constitutionally bound to enforce them, regardless of the will of the population. Article 130 also preserves any existing laws on the books, including those passed by the CPA. This, of course, is an essential aspect of any civilized democracy; citizens must accept the role which Washington has assigned them, turn over their natural resource wealth and economy to western control, accept restrictions on state assistance, and not complain. Dozens of impoverished third-world countries around the planet have been prescribed these economic “remedies,” such as the notorious IMF “structural adjustment programs” (to which Iraq subscribes as well) and economic “shock therapy.” In almost every case the result has been an unmitigated catastrophe for the people, particularly the poor. However, the trend has facilitated the accumulation of capital into fewer hands worldwide and vastly expanded the dominion of the world's largest and most powerful corporations, and so the US and allied governments continue to promote such policies worldwide.
This economic ideology is reflected in the significantly scaled back guarantees regarding the welfare of Iraqis in the final version, as compared to the earlier draft. The IMF, which has insisted that Iraq reduce its public subsidies, would surely have raised serious legal issues over the wide-ranging commitments to the general well-being found in the June draft. In accordance with democratic principles, the mass “protests and demonstrations across Iraq, regardless of ethnic or sectarian affiliations,” resulting from the “fear and desperation which any move to evoke the subsidies evoked” were violently crushed by Iraqi Security Forces.36 Article 12 of the early draft stated that “work is a right for every citizen” and that “the state is responsible to support the provision of work opportunities for all qualified, and pay monthly salaries for all unemployed for any reason until opportunities are provided; in the case of disability, handicap, or illness, until the malady ceases.” The final version simply states that “work is a right for all Iraqis in a way that guarantees a dignified life for them,” and that “the law shall regulate the relationship between employees and employers on economic bases and while observing the rules of social justice.” Observe the rules of social justice it may, but this version of the constitution does not codify those rules as Iraqi law, making this a totally irrelevant and meaningless statement.
Similarly, article 6 of the June draft pledged that “the state and regional governments shall combat illiteracy and provide their citizens with the right of free education at various stages.” The final version protects this right as well, but inserts language about private education also being “guaranteed” and “regulated by law,” opening up the possibility for education to be privatized. Article 7 of the early draft stated that “Iraqi citizens have the right to enjoy security and free health care. The Iraqi federal government and regional governments must provide it and expand the fields of prevention, treatment, and medication by the construction of various hospitals and health institutions.” In article 30 of the scaled-back final version, the state is merely obligated to “provide the means of prevention and treatment” by building hospitals and health institutions, and language has been inserted pertaining to the role of the private sector in providing health care. Article 17 from the June draft, deleted in the final, read “the state shall take the necessary measures to realize the exploitation of land suitable for agriculture, stop desertification, and work to raise the level of the peasant and help farmers gain land ownership in accordance with the law.” These changes are relevant because they provide a preview of the coming wholesale privatization of social services in Iraq, removing the burden from the government and from the myriad political issues the US has to deal with there. It is doubtless that this approach is already being advocated by the USAID-funded contractors working in Iraq to restructure Iraq's educational and health sectors.37
Perhaps the empty appeals to “social justice” contained in the final draft of the Iraqi constitution would be more believable were it not for the ardent anti-labor policies which have consistently been pursued during the US occupation. While Bremer saw fit to radically restructure the Iraqi economy from that which had existed under the regime of Saddam Hussein, the tyrant's “repressive, anti-union labor laws” remained on the books under the rule of the CPA and after, again upholding enlightened democratic ideals. Meanwhile, constant attempts by the Iraqi government to “interfere in union elections, as well as to retain overall control of their finances and to enforce a restrictive legal framework for their operation indicated that the impulse to curb the potential of an independent labor movement was strong.”38
Earlier provisions ensuring the Iraqi people's collective ownership of Iraq's oil and other natural resources have also been replaced. Article 17 of the June 30 draft read “all natural resources and the resulting revenues are owned by the people. The state shall preserve and invest them well.” This clause would have guaranteed public control of all wealth accruing from Iraq's natural resource wealth, trusted in the hands of the new democratically-controlled state to be expended according to the will of the population, in addition to being used to fund the aforementioned social programs. In the final version, the language is markedly different, merely stating that “oil and gas is the property of the Iraqi people in all the regions and governorates,” leaving open the possibility of others developing, exploiting, and profiting from the wealth of these resources. Meanwhile, article 26 specifically protects investors, binding the Iraqi state to “guarantee the encouragement of investment in the various sectors,” while article 23 states that “private property is protected” and guarantees the right of owners of private property to “benefit, exploit, and dispose” of it within the limits of the law.
This same motivation is also reflected in the alterations to what was originally article 8, now article 23. While the earlier draft insisted that “Iraqis have the complete and unconditional right of ownership in all areas without limitation,” the final version significantly narrows the protections guaranteed to Iraqis: “every Iraqi shall have the right to own property anywhere in Iraq. No others may possess immovable assets, except as exempted by law.” While the earlier version provided a constitutional guarantee of the right of Iraqis to complete and unconditional ownership in all areas, the final version only privileges them over foreigners in their right to own “immovable assets,” unless a law is passed exempting a foreigner. Any deal with a foreign oil company would simply have to include an exemption from this provision on the bill which the Parliament would vote onto meet the criteria of this claus. In contrast, removing the constitutional guarantee provided in the original version would have required a two-thirds majority in the Parliament as well as the consent of each of the regions. Furthermore, the former clause would protect other Iraqi assets, such as equity, real estate, and other capital, from foreign takeover. Given that Bremer's Order 39 already allows foreign ownership of Iraqi assets and given that this order will be perpetuated as law, the constitution in effect removes the restriction giving Iraqis exclusive ownership over assets in Iraq.
These changes strongly suggest that the path is being cleared for total US control over the Iraqi economy. This is also evident in article 112 of the August version, which goes so far as to say that
the federal government with the producing regional and governorate governments shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people, using the most advanced techniques of market principles and encouraging investment.
No comparable provision existed in the June 30 draft, as the clause guaranteeing the Iraqi people full ownership of oil resources and full control of all the profits accruing therefrom (Article 17) would directly contradict it. The “greatest benefit for the Iraqi people” would have already been decided – that they should own and control their own resource wealth. Far from such guarantees, the final version could allow for foreign investors to have as much right to Iraqi oil as Iraqis.
The “advanced techniques of market principles” and “investment” which is to orient Iraqi oil and gas policy according to the August version most likely refers to current plans to privatize the Iraqi National Oil Company and allow large multinational corporations to take control of Iraq's oil reserves.39 This would be done in a framework which is strikingly similar to that which the British employed during their imperial rule of Iraq, reconstituting something akin to the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, from which the IPC was born, allowed the large western oil companies “to dine off Iraq's wealth in a famously exploitative deal,” as Seamus Milne, a British journalist for the Guardian recently observed.40 In June 2008, the New York Times reported that the Bush administration had secretly facilitated talks between the Iraqi government and the very same oil companies which once comprised the IPC – Shell, Exxon Mobil, BP, and Total – for no-bid contracts on the pretext that they had been providing “free advice.” While the Russian company Lukoil had also provided such services, was not invited to join the consortium.41
While initial plans to present these firms with no-bid contracts failed under intense international pressure, Washington's efforts are now focused on the Iraqi oil law. A recently leaked version of the proposed law would allow two-thirds of Iraq's oil fields to be developed by private corporations, while all governing decisions over Iraq's oil, such as foreign contracts, would rest with a new body to be called the “Iraqi Oil and Gas Council” which would include private corporations as well.42 In other words, representatives from Shell, Exxon-Mobil, and other multinational oil companies would be approving their own contracts. The deal would allow Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs), under which the large western oil majors could take up to three quarters of Iraq's oil profits, and even denies the Iraqi government the ability to determine production levels. Furthermore, it distributes oil revenues directly to the three regions, undermining the central government and increasing the division within Iraq. Revealingly, the law was reported to have initially been written in English.43 Referring to these plans, Adil Abdel Mahdi, an SCIRI leader and Iraqi Vice President, told an audience in Washington that “this is very promising to the American investors and to American enterprises, certainly to oil companies.”44
Iraq's constitution also enshrines “fighting terrorism” as one of the state's key objectives. Article 7 outlaws any group which “adopts, incites, facilitates glorifies, promotes, or justifies racism or terrorism or accusations of being an infidel,” going on to bind the state to “combat terrorism in all its forms, and shall work to protect its territories from being a base, pathway, or field for terrorist activities.” As the term “terrorism” is not defined in the constitution, the Iraqi state is thus free to define the term as it chooses. Given the tendency of pro-occupation Iraqis and their US backers to use the term “terrorist” to refer to the resistance movement, the clause could easily be invoked to justify military offensives against political groups which refuse to accept the occupation and the political process that it has spawned. The “terrorism clause” could also be used as a legal justification for the continuing presence of US troops and bases in Iraq. It will not surprise the reader to learn that no comparable provision to article 7 existed in the June 30 draft.
IV. Federalism: Divide and RuleThe fact that both the Kurdish leadership of the northern province and the Shi'ite leadership (including SCIRI's al-Hakim) in the south have gone on record clearly in support of the privatization of oil resources has undoubtedly strongly influenced the favorable attitude of the US toward the federalization, and perhaps eventual breakup, of Iraq.45 This policy directly contradicts the wishes of the Iraqi people, who are overwhelmingly opposed to the idea of federalism. A September 2007 BBC poll of Iraqis found that just 9% favored a “country divided into separate states,” while 62% wanted a central government in Baghdad.46 Again we find the true nature of the “democracy” which the US seeks to spread to Iraq – the government is to do as we say, regardless of the will of the population. This strategy is reflected quite clearly in the constitution. In fact, one could easily read in the constitution and attempt to divide Iraq to the furthest extent possible, both ethnically and regionally. As Nathan Brown, an expert on Middle Eastern legal systems, put it, “it is difficult to imagine a more favorable set of constitutional provisions for creation of a southern region,” a semi-autonomous northern Kurdistan region already having been established and protected in the constitution.47
By speaking of the regions in sectarian terms, as in article 125, the US hopes to take advantage of Iraq's ethnic cleavages, using them as a pretext for dividing Iraq. The Shi'a majority has been excluded from the halls of power since the Ottoman times, when the apparent unruliness of the Shi'a as well as the Sunni orientation of the Ottoman leadership lead the Turks to install the seemingly more reliable Sunnis as the ruling elite.48 This power structure was maintained by the British both during the period of its direct rule and afterwards, when the British ruled indirectly through the Hashemite monarchy.49 This power structure persisted through the revolution in 1958, and was still present during the rule of Saddam Hussein. The overthrow of the Ba'ath regime by the United States consequently signaled the end of generations of Sunni domination, leading some Shi'a leaders to ally themselves with the US as the easiest way to secure their rule over the new political order. Partially as a result, the Sunnis “objected to almost all elements of the emerging Shi'ite-Kurdish bargain” during the constitution crafting process, resulting in the drafters voting to approve a constitution that did not have the support of the Sunnis.50 This is probably due in part to “a strong suspicion that it was merely a constitutional formula for the partition of the country.”51 Simultaneously, it is doubtless that Iran hopes a new Shi'ite controlled state will be firmly established on its border, and it has wisely moved to increase its commercial and cultural interactions with Iraq. Ironically, in many cases the US is inadvertently helping Iran's closest allies in Iraq's political and military institutions.
Charles Tripp adequately describes the policy of the British and its Iraqi allies towards the Kurds during the mandatory era in his excellent history of Iraq: the king and the British “seemed to agree that any tendency towards Kurdish separatism should be crushed, even if symbolic concessions to a specific Kurdish identity might be made.”52 US policy toward the Kurds is remarkably consistent with these observations. It is in the interests of the US, to some extent, to appear to appease these desires in exchange for help in securing US objectives, similar to the Kurdish strategy employed by the British.53 This was accomplished in the constitution by referring to the Iraqi union as voluntary and expressly preserving the two provisions of the Transitional Law which recognize the government of the Kurdistan region, and by requiring counteracting the population movements implemented by the Ba'ath regime, which Washington hopes will restore a friendly Kurdish majority to the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The oil deal announced last September between Hunt Oil and the Kurdish regional government (which includes PSAs) seems to confirm the wisdom of Washington's federal policy. While the White House issued public statements discouraging the deal for “undermining efforts to strengthen the Iraqi central government, which still had no national revenue-sharing law” and denied knowledge of the contract, e-mails and letters recently obtained by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee show that the administration actually approved of the oil deal.54
The Kurds, who generally look on the US occupation more favorably than other groups, have nationalist aspirations which date back to the formation of the modern state of Iraq, during the British mandate.55 In a previous epoch, the British worked to “maintain the fiction that the Iraqi government had conscientiously fulfilled the pledges it had made to the Kurds” to the League of Nations in the run-up to the admission of Iraq as an “independent” state in 1932, despite its support for the Iraqi government's brutal oppression. Similarly, the United States has routinely betrayed the Kurds when it is convenient in achieving its self-interested policy objectives.56 Their suffering under the regime of Saddam Hussein, often with the approval and support of the United States, only heightened these desires. It is these emotions which the US now seeks to manipulate to its advantage in separating Iraq into different regions. In 1975, the US and its puppet, the Shah in Iran, withdrew all support for the struggling minority population and closed the Iranian border, leaving the Kurds to their fate at the hands of Saddam Hussein. The year before, in 1974, the Iraqi government had “launched a war against the Kurds.”57 The Kurdish resistance, lead by Barzani, was largely surviving on aid from the US and Iran. Popular resistance to the egregious cruelty of the Iraqi army erupted throughout the country, leading to the arrest of thirty Shi'ileaders and the execution of five. After US and Iranian support was withdrawn, the revolt collapsed within weeks, allowing Saddam and Hasan al-Bakr to press ahead with prior plans for a massive ethnic cleansing of Kurdish regions. In total, half a million Kurds would be driven from their homes and relocated elsewhere in Iraq, while many of their villages were razed to the ground.58
In the 1980s, the US-Saddam alliance was important enough for Washington to block even mild protest over the sickening al-Anfal massacres, which featured the “regular” use against civilians of chemical weapons sold to Saddam by the United States, and were carried out “as much to inspire terror as to achieve any strictly military purpose.”59 As described by Iraq expert Charles Tripp:
Iraqi forces carried out a scorched-earth policy in all those areas associated with one or other of the Kurdish guerilla organizations, killing all the inhabitants and destroying their villages. Chemical weapons were now used routinely and the victims included women and children, as well as the men of military age who had always been targeted. Few were given the option of moving to resettlement camps. Faced by such an onslaught, the Kurdish guerilla organizations were powerless and tried instead to get their people to safety.60
This campaign included the Halabja gassing, which killed an estimated 5,000 people. In defense of its ally Saddam Hussein, the US struggled to blame the massacre on Iran until the evidence was too overwhelming to hide and distort. As the campaign of slaughter was winding down, roughly 80 percent of the villages in the Kurdish autonomous region were destroyed, much of the Kurds' agricultural land was deemed “prohibited territory,” and “possibly 100,000” people had lost their lives.61
To demonstrate the continuing friendship of the US and Iraq, George Bush invited Iraqi nuclear engineers to the United States in 1989 for advanced training in weapons production. In 1990, only a few months before Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, Bush sent a high-level Senatorial delegation to Iraq to ensure that the relationship remained strong despite occasional condemnations in the US press. Meanwhile, Bush overrode bans in order to provide Saddam with new loans, with the “goal of increasing US exports and [to] put us in a better position to deal with Iraq regarding its human rights record,” it was announced without compunction. All this without even mentioning the barbaric repression of the Turkish Kurds in the 90s, with the full approval and support of the Clinton administration. Tens of thousands were killed, thousands of towns and villages destroyed, millions driven from their homes. During the campaign, Turkey became the leading recipient of US arms, apart from Israel and Egypt, with the United States selling Turkey 80% of its weaponry.
V. Federalism in the ConstitutionIndeed, the constitution creates a situation quite favorable to the division of Iraq. Article 112 grants significant autonomy to the “governments of the regions and the provinces” in making oil policy, which keeps with the generally federalist tone that persists throughout the constitution. While article 121 reserves for the regional governments all “executive, legislative, and judicial powers” not explicitly granted to the federal government, chapter four only assigns the central government authority in the realms of defense and international relations. This federalist inclination is further reflected in articles 105 and 106, which establish “independent commissions” to help the regions and provinces participate in “managing the various state federal institutions” which have to do with foreign affairs (article 105) and to “monitor and allocate” the revenues of the central government (article 106). Article 111 (discussed above) gives ownership of oil and gas to “the people of Iraq,” but then adds “in all the regions and governorates,” which also seems to imply strong regional autonomy in matters of natural resource policy.
Article 121 circumscribes the authority of the central government even more drastically, delegating a tremendous amount of power to the subnational governments. In the area of foreign affairs, it gives the subnational governments shared responsibility for administering customs and even provides for their representation in Iraqi diplomatic missions. The other power granted the federal government, that of defense, does not include internal policing, a power reserved for the subnational governments in article 121, section 5. This provision gives the regional governments responsibility for regional “administrative requirements... particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces of the region,” explicitly naming “police, security forces, and guards” as examples of such forces [my emphasis]. This is likely to have the effect of transforming existing sectarian militias into regional security forces, again reinforcing the division of Iraq. More amazing still, article 121 gives the regional governments the right to “amend the national legislation” within their respective region in the event of a conflict between regional and federal law. Any attempt to modify the powers of the regions cannot be undertaken without the consent of the regional government.
VI. Conclusion: Neoliberalism for Islamism The writing of the Iraqi Constitution was part of a stunning display of hatred and contempt for democracy, in sharp contrast with its general depiction as the realization of Bush's “vision” of democracy in the Middle East. It would be difficult to craft a governing document which would better protect key US interests in Iraq or promote neoliberal economic ideals more actively. This should come as no surprise, as it was written by the US and those elements of the Iraqi elite who were willing to go along with US goals, which they saw as the only way to get what they wanted for themselves: power and privilege within Iraqi society. Obviously, Iraqis and Iraqi organizations who insist on the ending of the occupation before a legitimate political process can begin refused at the outset to take part in a process which they saw as illegitimate.
In exchange for the expansive neoliberal groundwork for the domination of the Iraqi economy by foreign investors embodied in the constitution, the US tolerated religious provisions required to placate important constituencies and secure that the constitution could be granted legitimacy through its passage by referendum. The US cares little about unimportant issues such as the protection of Iraqi political freedoms, the establishment of a stable and independent court system, and whether Islam is to be regarded as the official state religion and a “basic source of legislation,” so long as it is able to achieve its primary strategic goals. The structure and text of the Iraqi constitution clearly reflect these priorities.
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Notes:
1. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” September 2002. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf. While the National Security Strategy uses the word “preemptive,” long established in international law, the concept actually being articulated is “anticipatory self defense,” or preventive war. Any potential challenges to US global hegemony are to be blocked, using force if is deemed necessary by Washington. In other words, aggression.
2. Pilger, John. “John Pilger on why we ignored Iraq in the 1990s,” New Statesman, 4 October 2004
3. Quoted in Schaller, Michael. Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation. Oxford University Press. Excerpt obtained from http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/s/schaller-states.html. According to Schaller, Kennan wanted “A prosperous yet dependent ally would best serve American interests. This required imposing controls 'foolproof enough and cleverly enough exercised ... to have power over what Japan imports in the way of oil and other things.' Economic controls would give Washington 'veto power over what she does.'”
4. Brezinski, Zbignew. “Hegemonic Quicksand,” The National Interest Winter 2003-04. www.kas.de/upload/dokumente/brzezinski.pdf. In Brezinski's words: “America's security role in the region gives it indirect but politically critical leverage on the European and Asian economies that are also dependent on energy exports from the region.”
5. Shoup, Lawrence and William Minter, “Imperial Brain Trust.” Monthly Review, 1977, 130. Shoup and Minter's study of the War and Peace Studies project of the Council on Foreign Relations and State Department from 1939 to 1945.
6. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1945, viii, 45.
7. Bronson, Ibid. pp. 39 - 40
8. “Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary. November 26, 2007. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071126-11.html
9. “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities.” United States Government Accountability Office, March 28, 2007. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/13087/operation_iraqi_freedom.html
10. Milne, Seamus. “Bush is trying to impose a classic colonial status on Iraq,” The Guardian, June 26, 2008.
11. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pg. 73 - 74
12. Ibid. pg. 75 - 76
13. “President Bush Signs H.R. 4986, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 into Law.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, January 28, 2008. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/print/20080128-10.html
14. Brown, Nathan “Iraq's Constitutional Conundrum.” August 31, 2005, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
15. Brown, Nathan “The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 16, 2005. Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17423
16. “Let's All Go to the Yard Sale: Iraq's Economic Liberalization,” The Economist, September 27, 2003.
17. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pg. 290; Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 39, Foreign Investment. September 19, 2003. Available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/index.html#Regulations
18. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pg. 290
19. Pincus, Walter and Rajiv Chandrasekaran. “U.S. Edicts Curb Power Of Iraq's Leadership.” Washington Post, June 27, 2004.
20. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pg. 44
21. Ibid. pg. 285
22. Associated Press, “US will help draft Iraq Constitution,” November 16, 2003; Barbara Slavin and Steven Komarrow, “Iraq's Temporary Constitution to Resemble America's,” USA Today, November 17, 2003
23. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pg. 286
24. Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, “Envoy Bowed to Pressure in Choosing Leaders,” Washington Post, June 2, 2004; Weisman, Steven, “Iraq's New Government Faces Bargaining Over Its Power,” New York Times, June 2, 2004; Calabresi, Massimo, “Our (Irascible) Man in Iraq,” Time, June 28, 2004; Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pp. 286 - 287
25. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pp. 294; McCarthy, Rory “Uneasy Truce in the City of Ghosts.” The Guardian, April 24, 2004.
26. Brown, Nathan, “Constitution of Iraq: Draft Bill of Rights,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 27, 2005.
27. Georgy, Michael, “Iraq Parliament May Back Charter, Sunnis Opposed,” Reuters, August 28, 2005; Negus, Steve and Dhiya Rasan, “Iraqi Parliament Delays Constitution Vote,” Financial Times, August 23, 2005.
28. “Iraq 'Needs Federalism' to Prevent Civil War,” Reuters, August 20, 2005.
29. Finer, Jonathan, and Omar Fekeiki, “US Steps Up Role in Iraq Charter Talks,” Washington Post, August 13, 2005; Khalil, Ashraf and Caesar Ahmed, “Iraqis Extend Deadline for Constitution,” Los Angeles Times, August 16, 2005
30. Knickmeyer, Ellen and Jonathan Finer, “Iraqis Submit Charter but Delay Vote,” Washington Post, August 23, 2005
31. Finer, Jonathan and Omar Fekeiki, “US Steps Up Role in Iraq Charter Talks,” Washington Post, August 13, 2005
32. Howard, Michael, “Iraqi Constitution in Trouble as Sunnis Walk Out,” The Guardian, July 21, 2005.
33. Finer, Jonathan, and Omar Fekeiki, “US Steps Up Role in Iraq Charter Talks,” Washington Post, August 13, 2005
34. Georgy, Michael, “Iraq Parliament May Back Charter, Sunnis Opposed,” Reuters, August 28, 2005
35. For the June 30 version, see Brown, Nathan, “Constitution of Iraq: Draft Bill of Rights,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 27, 2005, cited above.
36. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pg. 298.
37. For a list of contract recipients and their various projects, visit http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/
38. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pg. 299.
39. Milne, Seamus. “Bush is Trying to Impose a Classic Colonial Status on Iraq,” The Guardian, June 26, 2008.
40. Ibid.
41. Turse, Nick. “Pentagon Hands Iraq Oil Deal to Shell.” AlterNet, October 4, 2008.
42. Iraq Draft Oil Law, translated by Raed Jarrar. Available in English at http://www.al-ghad.org/2007/02/14/exclusive-the-official-draft-of-the-oil-and-gas-law-of-the-iraq-republic-15-jan-2007/
43. “New Iraq Oil Law To Open Iraq’s Oil Reserves to Western Companies.” Democracy Now!, February 20, 2007.
44. Mekay, Emad. “US to Take Bigger Bite of Iraq's Economic Pie,” Inter Press Service, December 23, 2004.
45. Cole, Juan. “US/Iraqi Attack on Samarra Region; Parliament Sworn In.” Informed Comment, March 17, 2006. http://www.juancole.com/2006/03/usiraqi-attack-on-samarra-region.html
46. “Iraq Poll September 2007.” BBC, ABC News, and NHK. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/14547/
47. Brown, Nathan “The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 16, 2005. Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17423
48. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pg. 12
49. Ibid. pg. 31, 77
50. Brown, Nathan. “Iraq's Constitutional Conundrum.” August 31, 2005, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
51. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press.
52. Ibid. pg. 66
53. Ibid pg. 34
54. “US Officials Condoned Hunt-Kurd Oil Deal-Documents,” Reuters, July 3, 2008.
55. Ibid pg. 34
56. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pp. 72-73
57. Makiya, Kanan. Republic of Fear. 1998, University of California Press. pg. 233.
58. Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. 2007, Cambridge University Press. pp. 203-204.
59. Ibid pg. 235.
60. Ibid pp. 237
61. Ibid pp. 236
