I have finally arrived in Ramallah; the hectic running around of the first ten days of sessions, workshops, and lectures finally behind me. Like every day in this part of the world, it is a bright, beautiful sunny day. Something about the atmosphere feels positive, fresh, and clean. The taxi dropped us in front of our new home off Jaffa street, where Ilham, a contact of Dr. Lukacs', was waiting for us outside. She had with her a small child, who waited patiently in her arms while its mother helped some of the newest (and utterly clueless) Ramallah residents into their quarters. In a dreamlike state of disbelief at the prospect of making my home in the Occupied West Bank for the next two months or so, I opened the heavy iron door to the apartment building and started inside, my new roommates close behind.
Walking into the dark, echoing hall, Ilham jammed the elevator button with her finger a few times before giving up and instructing us to walk up the stairs. After quickly jogging up the stairs with my own bags, I lugged the significantly larger bags of some of my female counterparts up five sweaty flights before collapsing onto the nearest couch. I was quite surprised by the accommodations. For the eight of us (3 men, 4 women) we have two large apartments, each complete with a living room, two bathrooms, a full kitchen, and two or three bedrooms, respectively. While nothing ostentatious or flashy, we have new furniture, which consists of a couch and two love seats in the living room, a kitchen table, and several chairs in the kitchens. Granted, these are no “lazy boy” luxury couches; none of them have any cushion or padding to speak of, which has generated a debate over whether it would be more comfortable to sit on the carpet. Regardless, the apartments will seemingly be more than adequate for our needs over the next two months.
Before long, our landlord, Mr. Salah, was over to welcome us as well, which meant an awfully long-winded discussion about the most trivial details. A heavy, balding man in his late fifties wearing a flowing brown robe, he reminded me perhaps of a Palestinian Friar Tuck. As he informed me, he had once owned a restaurant in Washington, DC near the Chinatown Metro stop. Thinking about my home in Washington DC, my friends, school, and life there felt like a world away at this moment; a distant far-off land which almost seemed like a scene out of a fiction book. None of us appeared able to restrain our excitement enough to really care about extra keys, the status of the broken elevator, the various light switch problems, and other such minutiae, but this did not stop the persistent Mr. Salah from continuing for what seemed like hours in a whispered, monotone voice. After he had finally finished, we walked into the girls' apartment, rejoining Ilham and the baby, a sight which had the women transfixed with smiles and laughter. Mr. Salah, breaking out in a huge, warm grin exclaimed “welcome to Palestine!” The warmth of the room, the sun pouring in through the windows, everyone smiling – the energy was so positive I felt that I would burst out into tears. We had arrived.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Monday, July 14, 2008
Us vs. Them: Racism and Distortion in Discussions of Palestinian Violence
There are two ways of approaching the study of “terrorism.” The first demands that one undertake serious inquiry into its motivations and causes, as well as engage in a careful evaluation of its effects on all parties concerned. The second, perhaps more common approach among Western elites and intellectuals, is simply to label violence (invariably committed by some shadowy, monolithic “them”) against “us,” wholesome and benevolent purveyors of peace, as “terrorism.” In the current era, “they” are increasingly defined as “the Muslims,” a group whose many complex facets, divisions, and varying ideologies are easily glossed over, leaving a picture of a vast horde of irrational fanatics desperately and unceasingly striving to destroy “us” and our civilized, modern values. Israel is uniformly included in the “us” category, and in the context of discussion of violence committed against Israel “the Palestinians” are the evil, conniving “they.” Thus, it is entirely “natural,” even a force of nature, for “them” to commit violent acts as part of “their” ongoing plan, as a unit, to destroy “us.”
Bradley Burston, a staff writer for Haaretz, recently published a piece in that paper titled “Palestinian Terrorism as a Natural Act.” It is difficult to extract a coherent strand of argument from Burston's ranting, but with a little effort and thought it is possible to perceive the premises and biases on which his view rests. From the title alone one could reasonably guess that nowhere in the 725 words that follow is there anything resembling thoughtful analysis or rational inquiry. This is an unfortunate but common feature of discussions of Palestinian violence against Israelis. In the piece, Mr. Burston focuses on the experience of a Jewish woman, driving into the center of Jerusalem with her child in the car, who unexpectedly became a victim of Palestinian terrorism when “the Hero of Palestine” (Burston's words) an Arab “who has taken it upon himself to kill Jews” drove a bulldozer into her car and “crushes it flat.” The woman, doing “what Jews have learned to do since the Holocaust, and for 2,000 years before that” threw her infant child from the window in order to save its life. In keeping with the portrayal of “them” as a featureless monolith, Burston informs us that “Palestinian groups” were “fall[ing] over one another trying to claim the bulldozer attack,” including the moderate and peace-loving (by virtue of their willingness to concede to “our” demands) Fatah Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
Rather than try to undertake an examination of the phenomenon in question, Burston insists that we “[cannot] understand [Palestinian terrorism] as the natural outgrowth of the crimes of occupation.” Thus the Palestinians are naturally terrorists, the vast majority of their society and leadership supports violence against innocent Jews, “women and children and the elderly and the infirm,” simply out of pursuit of “the vile thrill of vengeance,” for “nothing more than seeing Jews dead and gone.” The daily crimes and atrocities committed by Israel against Palestinians, the overt theft of land and resources, the constant assaults on dignity, and the deliberate, methodical destruction of an entire society could thus not have played a part in motivating the incident. The man is the “Hero of Palestine” not because there was any outpouring of support for the attack he committed, but because it is simply assumed that the backward savages seek nothing more than the destruction of democratic and civilized Israel and the deaths of as many Jews as possible (“us”).
An important aspect of the presentation of “our” society as enlightened and utopian is “our” tremendous effort to help other, more backward peoples advance to our level. It therefore follows that the appropriate response from the indigenous people who have been the fortunate beneficiary of these noble efforts is gratitude and thanks. This common facet of the debate is particularly noticeable in coverage of the “peace process,” with the Palestinians expected to react with appreciation for the generous deal the US and Israel were charitably offering. Similarly, Burston states (needlessly) that “Jewish doctors were treating Arab infants, women, the elderly, and the infirm here [in Jerusalem] as early as 1902.” Burtson's implication, thinly veiled, is that even after all “we” have done for “them,” the thankless savages can only react by murdering innocent civilians without any serious provocation. Burston here erases the Palestinian narrative and delegitimizes their suffering, even insisting outright that Israeli policy could not be connected to Palestinian violence. When constructing the world in such a way, the actual facts of the situation are of no consequence; one can simply rely on racism, oversimplification, and emotionality.
Burston further states that he “would like to ask for proof of what it is that Palestinians really want. I no longer believe that it's as simple as wanting statehood.” That the Palestinians, including Hamas, have accepted the existence of Israel as a Jewish state on 78% of historic Palestine (the pre-1967 border), offering to accept merely the remaining 22% to form an independent Palestinian state is apparently unimportant. That even Hamas had agreed, in the Mecca Agreement, to focus its resistance activities only on the “lands of 1967,” as opposed to those of 1948 (Israel) is also apparently inconsequential. A better question for Burston to ask would be “what do the Israelis want?” Many scholars, both within and outside Israel, have argued that even Israel does not know the answer. A few of its desires are clear: it wants to be a Jewish state, it wants to be a “democracy” (the actual merits of this claim are certainly debatable), and it has claimed to want a two-state solution. While they claim to want these things, where is the proof? The Palestinians, in 1988 (reaffirmed in 1993), conceded to all of these demands. Yet Israel continues, and even accelerates, a set of policies the implication of which is to make the creation of a Palestinian state on any part of the territory impossible, depriving the Palestinians (and themselves) of ever being able to reach a two-state solution. If Israel does indeed desire a two-state settlement, which would include the right to hold on to the vast majority of the lands mostly successfully cleansed of Arab inhabitants in 1948, why do these policies persist? They may claim they want such a solution, but where is the proof?
To Burston the attack happened because “what a critical mass of Palestinians want most” is to drive the Jews into the sea, to “see Jews dead and gone,” even more than they want a state. The violence, as Burston sees it, was directed at Jews simply because they were Jews, in a pseudo-Holocaust framework. This claim, as I have discussed above, is ludicrous. In fact, a similar charge could much more accurately be leveled at the Zionist enterprise than the Palestinian national liberation movement. What, for example, was the crime of the Arabs who were driven from their homes in 1948, a deliberate, planned military campaign of ethnic cleansing as Israel's “new historians” have revealed, other than being Arab and living on land claimed by the new “chosen people?” What is the crime of Palestinians whose land is stolen and used for the construction of Jewish-only settlements, or whose communities and territory exist behind prison walls? Human rights groups, the UN, and countless others have deemed the Israeli policy in Gaza as an illegal act of “collective punishment,” by definition involving the abuse of those who are innocent of any crime. Every resident of Gaza is subjected to constant attack from the most sophisticated weaponry in the world, while simultaneously being deprived of even the basic means to survive, including food, medicine, clean water, electricity, and so on. The sheer scale of the violence against the civilian population of Gaza, incidentally, would meet any reasonable definition of terrorism. What crime did the Palestinians, as a people, commit that justifies the subjugation of every Palestinian man, woman, and child to a life under military occupation without a future, while the past is consistently erased and the whole society ground into the dirt?
To Burston, the attack is just one more sign that the Palestinians are guided by an overwhelming anti-Semitism than by their desire for independent statehood. Consistently omitting Israeli actions, he sees the attack another in a series of indications that this is the case, from launching rockets at Israel despite the cease-fire onward. His view seems to be that the Palestinians should be given their basic rights in bits and pieces, in reward for their good behavior. The main responsibility of Palestinians is to provide Israel with security, an obligation which once achieved may result in Palestinian statehood. Grossly disproportionate Israeli attacks on Gaza, as well as Israeli cease-fire violations (and subsequent Hamas restraint) remain unmentioned, as does the fact that it was the Hamas government which pushed for the cease-fire in the first place, also consistently calling for negotiations since their election in 2006. The US/Israeli response to their election was to declare that every member of Hamas would be targeted for assassination (a war crime) and a siege would be placed on Palestine, torturing all of its 5 million residents without discrimination. Hamas' efforts to arrest those members of the Al-Aqsa brigades responsible for launching rockets in violation of the cease-fire also contradicts his conclusion, despite the clear support and funding of the West and Israel for the Fatah party.
Of course it goes without saying that attacking busloads of civilians with a bulldozer is unacceptable, be they Jewish or not. This point does not even have to be argued. Yet in order to do something about violence, “terrorism” or otherwise, serious efforts have to be made not just to understand the causes and motivations of those committing violent acts, but “we” must endeavor to understand “them,” in order to begin to reveal the false nature of this dichotomy in the first place. We are all human beings, and as such will resist having our land stolen, our resources expropriated, our houses demolished, our villages bombed, our children starved, and our culture and society destroyed while a new, modern state is built on its ashes as if it never existed. Until the issue of what was done, and is being done, to the Palestinian people is addressed, the conflict – and periodic episodes of violence such as that in Jerusalem last week – will go on. Progress can only come through a serious attempt to acknowledge and understand the “other.” This has to mean recognizing that Palestinians are more than inhuman monsters who commit terrorist atrocities as a matter of course, simply to see Jews suffer. Rather, something truly novel in the long, sad history of the Palestine-Israel conflict will have to occur: the very real and legitimate grievances of the Palestinian people must be recognized and addressed.
Bradley Burston, a staff writer for Haaretz, recently published a piece in that paper titled “Palestinian Terrorism as a Natural Act.” It is difficult to extract a coherent strand of argument from Burston's ranting, but with a little effort and thought it is possible to perceive the premises and biases on which his view rests. From the title alone one could reasonably guess that nowhere in the 725 words that follow is there anything resembling thoughtful analysis or rational inquiry. This is an unfortunate but common feature of discussions of Palestinian violence against Israelis. In the piece, Mr. Burston focuses on the experience of a Jewish woman, driving into the center of Jerusalem with her child in the car, who unexpectedly became a victim of Palestinian terrorism when “the Hero of Palestine” (Burston's words) an Arab “who has taken it upon himself to kill Jews” drove a bulldozer into her car and “crushes it flat.” The woman, doing “what Jews have learned to do since the Holocaust, and for 2,000 years before that” threw her infant child from the window in order to save its life. In keeping with the portrayal of “them” as a featureless monolith, Burston informs us that “Palestinian groups” were “fall[ing] over one another trying to claim the bulldozer attack,” including the moderate and peace-loving (by virtue of their willingness to concede to “our” demands) Fatah Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
Rather than try to undertake an examination of the phenomenon in question, Burston insists that we “[cannot] understand [Palestinian terrorism] as the natural outgrowth of the crimes of occupation.” Thus the Palestinians are naturally terrorists, the vast majority of their society and leadership supports violence against innocent Jews, “women and children and the elderly and the infirm,” simply out of pursuit of “the vile thrill of vengeance,” for “nothing more than seeing Jews dead and gone.” The daily crimes and atrocities committed by Israel against Palestinians, the overt theft of land and resources, the constant assaults on dignity, and the deliberate, methodical destruction of an entire society could thus not have played a part in motivating the incident. The man is the “Hero of Palestine” not because there was any outpouring of support for the attack he committed, but because it is simply assumed that the backward savages seek nothing more than the destruction of democratic and civilized Israel and the deaths of as many Jews as possible (“us”).
An important aspect of the presentation of “our” society as enlightened and utopian is “our” tremendous effort to help other, more backward peoples advance to our level. It therefore follows that the appropriate response from the indigenous people who have been the fortunate beneficiary of these noble efforts is gratitude and thanks. This common facet of the debate is particularly noticeable in coverage of the “peace process,” with the Palestinians expected to react with appreciation for the generous deal the US and Israel were charitably offering. Similarly, Burston states (needlessly) that “Jewish doctors were treating Arab infants, women, the elderly, and the infirm here [in Jerusalem] as early as 1902.” Burtson's implication, thinly veiled, is that even after all “we” have done for “them,” the thankless savages can only react by murdering innocent civilians without any serious provocation. Burston here erases the Palestinian narrative and delegitimizes their suffering, even insisting outright that Israeli policy could not be connected to Palestinian violence. When constructing the world in such a way, the actual facts of the situation are of no consequence; one can simply rely on racism, oversimplification, and emotionality.
Burston further states that he “would like to ask for proof of what it is that Palestinians really want. I no longer believe that it's as simple as wanting statehood.” That the Palestinians, including Hamas, have accepted the existence of Israel as a Jewish state on 78% of historic Palestine (the pre-1967 border), offering to accept merely the remaining 22% to form an independent Palestinian state is apparently unimportant. That even Hamas had agreed, in the Mecca Agreement, to focus its resistance activities only on the “lands of 1967,” as opposed to those of 1948 (Israel) is also apparently inconsequential. A better question for Burston to ask would be “what do the Israelis want?” Many scholars, both within and outside Israel, have argued that even Israel does not know the answer. A few of its desires are clear: it wants to be a Jewish state, it wants to be a “democracy” (the actual merits of this claim are certainly debatable), and it has claimed to want a two-state solution. While they claim to want these things, where is the proof? The Palestinians, in 1988 (reaffirmed in 1993), conceded to all of these demands. Yet Israel continues, and even accelerates, a set of policies the implication of which is to make the creation of a Palestinian state on any part of the territory impossible, depriving the Palestinians (and themselves) of ever being able to reach a two-state solution. If Israel does indeed desire a two-state settlement, which would include the right to hold on to the vast majority of the lands mostly successfully cleansed of Arab inhabitants in 1948, why do these policies persist? They may claim they want such a solution, but where is the proof?
To Burston the attack happened because “what a critical mass of Palestinians want most” is to drive the Jews into the sea, to “see Jews dead and gone,” even more than they want a state. The violence, as Burston sees it, was directed at Jews simply because they were Jews, in a pseudo-Holocaust framework. This claim, as I have discussed above, is ludicrous. In fact, a similar charge could much more accurately be leveled at the Zionist enterprise than the Palestinian national liberation movement. What, for example, was the crime of the Arabs who were driven from their homes in 1948, a deliberate, planned military campaign of ethnic cleansing as Israel's “new historians” have revealed, other than being Arab and living on land claimed by the new “chosen people?” What is the crime of Palestinians whose land is stolen and used for the construction of Jewish-only settlements, or whose communities and territory exist behind prison walls? Human rights groups, the UN, and countless others have deemed the Israeli policy in Gaza as an illegal act of “collective punishment,” by definition involving the abuse of those who are innocent of any crime. Every resident of Gaza is subjected to constant attack from the most sophisticated weaponry in the world, while simultaneously being deprived of even the basic means to survive, including food, medicine, clean water, electricity, and so on. The sheer scale of the violence against the civilian population of Gaza, incidentally, would meet any reasonable definition of terrorism. What crime did the Palestinians, as a people, commit that justifies the subjugation of every Palestinian man, woman, and child to a life under military occupation without a future, while the past is consistently erased and the whole society ground into the dirt?
To Burston, the attack is just one more sign that the Palestinians are guided by an overwhelming anti-Semitism than by their desire for independent statehood. Consistently omitting Israeli actions, he sees the attack another in a series of indications that this is the case, from launching rockets at Israel despite the cease-fire onward. His view seems to be that the Palestinians should be given their basic rights in bits and pieces, in reward for their good behavior. The main responsibility of Palestinians is to provide Israel with security, an obligation which once achieved may result in Palestinian statehood. Grossly disproportionate Israeli attacks on Gaza, as well as Israeli cease-fire violations (and subsequent Hamas restraint) remain unmentioned, as does the fact that it was the Hamas government which pushed for the cease-fire in the first place, also consistently calling for negotiations since their election in 2006. The US/Israeli response to their election was to declare that every member of Hamas would be targeted for assassination (a war crime) and a siege would be placed on Palestine, torturing all of its 5 million residents without discrimination. Hamas' efforts to arrest those members of the Al-Aqsa brigades responsible for launching rockets in violation of the cease-fire also contradicts his conclusion, despite the clear support and funding of the West and Israel for the Fatah party.
Of course it goes without saying that attacking busloads of civilians with a bulldozer is unacceptable, be they Jewish or not. This point does not even have to be argued. Yet in order to do something about violence, “terrorism” or otherwise, serious efforts have to be made not just to understand the causes and motivations of those committing violent acts, but “we” must endeavor to understand “them,” in order to begin to reveal the false nature of this dichotomy in the first place. We are all human beings, and as such will resist having our land stolen, our resources expropriated, our houses demolished, our villages bombed, our children starved, and our culture and society destroyed while a new, modern state is built on its ashes as if it never existed. Until the issue of what was done, and is being done, to the Palestinian people is addressed, the conflict – and periodic episodes of violence such as that in Jerusalem last week – will go on. Progress can only come through a serious attempt to acknowledge and understand the “other.” This has to mean recognizing that Palestinians are more than inhuman monsters who commit terrorist atrocities as a matter of course, simply to see Jews suffer. Rather, something truly novel in the long, sad history of the Palestine-Israel conflict will have to occur: the very real and legitimate grievances of the Palestinian people must be recognized and addressed.
Sunday, July 6, 2008
Day 8 (June 10): Yitzak Rabin Center
Liberal Israeli doves, such as Shimon Peres and Yitzak Rabin, are widely considered to be allies of the Palestinians, great purveyors of peace and accommodation. Today, at our visit to the Yitzak Rabin center, we received a heavy dose of propaganda on behalf of such liberal Zionism, as represented by both Rabin and Shimon Peres. Unfortunately, as a result of the high-minded rhetoric espoused by these doves, and the swarms of international correspondents who surround and happily lap it up, package it, and deliver it around the globe, they are mistaken for being wonderful champions of peace. It should come as no surprise to those who follow the actual situation, as opposed to the fantasy world painted on the pages of the New York Times, that this is quite far from the truth. The clips of Rabin's speeches we were shown were inspiring and wonderful; if they were a reflection of the actual policies and attitude of his government, the conflict would long be over. After all, the term “conflict” is barely adequate to describe the situation at all; one people, backed by tremendous military and economic force, is slowly but surely crushing and dispossessing another, a process which produces occasional resistance of various sorts. The fact that a crazed fundamentalist fanatic shot Rabin for even daring to suggest that the Palestinians should be mildly accommodated, through Israeli self-restraint, does not mean that he actually pursued measures beyond mere rhetorical flourishes.
Rabin's benevolent and generous plan for “peace,” unfortunately forever enshrined in the embarrassingly one-sided Oslo Accords, was to substitute direct control, in the form of Israeli troops antagonistically patrolling city centers, for indirect control, which meant allowing the PA to be responsible for mundane municipal duties and whose primary goal was to ensure Israeli security, while Israel retained unilateral control of entries and exits, water, overall security, and the right to invade Palestinian controlled areas at will, unresisted by the PA security forces. As Rabin and his staff repeatedly bragged publicly, this allowed the accelerated division of Palestinian territory into isolated bantustans, the building of even more settlements than the egregious Netanyahu, erecting more checkpoints, and so on. For example, in a television interview in March, 1997, Rabin advisor Yosi Beilin, a leading Israeli dove widely considered a friend of the Palestinians, said “I am in favor of building everywhere in East Jerusalem, including the building of Har Homa, since this is our right; the question is one of timing, and clever tactics. We [the Rabin government] increased settlements by 50 percent, we built in Judea and Samaria, but we did it quietly and with wisdom. You [the Netanyahu government] proclaim your intentions every morning, frighten the Palestinians and transform the topic of Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel – a matter which all Israelis agreed upon – into a subject of worldwide debate. The main thing is to get the Palestinians to agree that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Without their agreeing to this, there will be no agreement.”
Likewise, Shimon Peres, that other “great man of peace,” in an interview with Der Spiegel on March 5, 1995, refused to accept that settlements were an obstacle to peace. Rather, the main issue was “how the settlers and Palestinians get on with each other.” The settlers, who have a right to settle in “Eretz Yisrael,” also thus have license to steal Palestinian land so long as they aren't too mean about it; meanwhile, the troublesome natives should learn their place and accept the inevitability of the takeover by the “chosen people.” When the interviewer said he found it “inconceivable that all the settlers should remain in the West Bank following the conclusion of peace,” the angelic Peres answered “that is your opinion, I find it conceivable.”
Despite the differences in style, the racism of Zionist ideology was just as ingrained in Rabin and Peres as it is with the likes of the despicable Netanyahu. As leaders, all three were radically committed to the superiority of Israeli Jews over Palestinian Arabs, perhaps all Arabs. None would seriously consider conceding sovereignty to the Palestinians, despite the self-declared noble intentions of the doves. All three see the Arabs as being required to satisfy the needs of Israel in political, economic and military (“security”) dimensions. Where they differ is in that Peres and Rabin manipulated naïve notions of a “peace process” to keep Israel in a position of superiority whereby it dictated the terms, the agenda, and every outcome, without giving up a single strategic objective. By contrast, Netanyahu felt no need for such a charade; his view was that Israel would have its way, and the Palestinians would be bludgeoned into a dazed acceptance by Israel's sheer military and economic might. We also cannot forget Peres' vicious and totally unrestrained terror bombing of Lebanon, land expropriation, sealing off Area A from Areas B and C (both under de facto or actual Israeli control, respectively), strangling the already decimated Palestinian economy.
While Netanyahu's contempt for the Palestinian people could not have been more central to his proclamations and policies, neither Rabin nor Peres cared in the final analysis what Israel's actions cost the Palestinians as a people. Netanyahu does not care what anyone thinks, while the most I can say for Rabin and Peres is that they sought moral approval from the Arab states and others for the policies of the Israeli government. While Peres and Rabin pursued the more indirect approach described above, Netanyahu wanted the Israeli settlers and military to be seen by the whole world, as a sign of overwhelming Israeli might. Netanyahu's electoral victory in 1996 did not mark a change of course in Israeli policy; it merely exposed the “peace process” for the fraud it always was. In the end, Oslo was not just a failure because it was grossly unfair to the Palestinians (which of course it was), but because Israeli leaders proved unwilling to take the necessary step forward from the long history of humiliating the Palestinians into submission. Rather than pursue the real steps which could have produced a lasting peace based on coexistance and equality, both Rabin and Peres tragically opted to proceed as they always had, consolidating their gains by force and with utter contempt for the Arabs.
Rabin's benevolent and generous plan for “peace,” unfortunately forever enshrined in the embarrassingly one-sided Oslo Accords, was to substitute direct control, in the form of Israeli troops antagonistically patrolling city centers, for indirect control, which meant allowing the PA to be responsible for mundane municipal duties and whose primary goal was to ensure Israeli security, while Israel retained unilateral control of entries and exits, water, overall security, and the right to invade Palestinian controlled areas at will, unresisted by the PA security forces. As Rabin and his staff repeatedly bragged publicly, this allowed the accelerated division of Palestinian territory into isolated bantustans, the building of even more settlements than the egregious Netanyahu, erecting more checkpoints, and so on. For example, in a television interview in March, 1997, Rabin advisor Yosi Beilin, a leading Israeli dove widely considered a friend of the Palestinians, said “I am in favor of building everywhere in East Jerusalem, including the building of Har Homa, since this is our right; the question is one of timing, and clever tactics. We [the Rabin government] increased settlements by 50 percent, we built in Judea and Samaria, but we did it quietly and with wisdom. You [the Netanyahu government] proclaim your intentions every morning, frighten the Palestinians and transform the topic of Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel – a matter which all Israelis agreed upon – into a subject of worldwide debate. The main thing is to get the Palestinians to agree that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Without their agreeing to this, there will be no agreement.”
Likewise, Shimon Peres, that other “great man of peace,” in an interview with Der Spiegel on March 5, 1995, refused to accept that settlements were an obstacle to peace. Rather, the main issue was “how the settlers and Palestinians get on with each other.” The settlers, who have a right to settle in “Eretz Yisrael,” also thus have license to steal Palestinian land so long as they aren't too mean about it; meanwhile, the troublesome natives should learn their place and accept the inevitability of the takeover by the “chosen people.” When the interviewer said he found it “inconceivable that all the settlers should remain in the West Bank following the conclusion of peace,” the angelic Peres answered “that is your opinion, I find it conceivable.”
Despite the differences in style, the racism of Zionist ideology was just as ingrained in Rabin and Peres as it is with the likes of the despicable Netanyahu. As leaders, all three were radically committed to the superiority of Israeli Jews over Palestinian Arabs, perhaps all Arabs. None would seriously consider conceding sovereignty to the Palestinians, despite the self-declared noble intentions of the doves. All three see the Arabs as being required to satisfy the needs of Israel in political, economic and military (“security”) dimensions. Where they differ is in that Peres and Rabin manipulated naïve notions of a “peace process” to keep Israel in a position of superiority whereby it dictated the terms, the agenda, and every outcome, without giving up a single strategic objective. By contrast, Netanyahu felt no need for such a charade; his view was that Israel would have its way, and the Palestinians would be bludgeoned into a dazed acceptance by Israel's sheer military and economic might. We also cannot forget Peres' vicious and totally unrestrained terror bombing of Lebanon, land expropriation, sealing off Area A from Areas B and C (both under de facto or actual Israeli control, respectively), strangling the already decimated Palestinian economy.
While Netanyahu's contempt for the Palestinian people could not have been more central to his proclamations and policies, neither Rabin nor Peres cared in the final analysis what Israel's actions cost the Palestinians as a people. Netanyahu does not care what anyone thinks, while the most I can say for Rabin and Peres is that they sought moral approval from the Arab states and others for the policies of the Israeli government. While Peres and Rabin pursued the more indirect approach described above, Netanyahu wanted the Israeli settlers and military to be seen by the whole world, as a sign of overwhelming Israeli might. Netanyahu's electoral victory in 1996 did not mark a change of course in Israeli policy; it merely exposed the “peace process” for the fraud it always was. In the end, Oslo was not just a failure because it was grossly unfair to the Palestinians (which of course it was), but because Israeli leaders proved unwilling to take the necessary step forward from the long history of humiliating the Palestinians into submission. Rather than pursue the real steps which could have produced a lasting peace based on coexistance and equality, both Rabin and Peres tragically opted to proceed as they always had, consolidating their gains by force and with utter contempt for the Arabs.
Reflections on a Week in Ramallah
I have spent the last week of my life living and working in the (temporary) West Bank capital, Ramallah. As I write this, the call to prayer is echoing down the dusty streets, inviting believers to come and worship. The cool night air blows in through my open kitchen window, followed by the bluster and cheer of a wedding party, punctuated by loud fireworks. At times, it is hard to believe I am actually here. Picturing myself on a map, how far away I am from everything and everyone I know, is intimidating. My surroundings are foreign and unfamiliar; it requires a deep breath to go outside and face the world. Going down the street to get a carton of milk or eggs is exhausting, both because of the heat and because of the sheer alienness of my environment. Everyone is friendly and warm, a phenomenon which can be difficult in its own way as well. I often feel as if I have to go out of my way not to be rude to strangers who offer me a handshake, or invite me to a cafe for a cup of Arabic coffee. I wonder how much of this is the genuine kindness of Arab culture and how much is fascination with a connection to the outside world. Palestine is, after all, a gigantic prison. The Israelis control not just the borders of the West Bank itself, but of each of the individual, isolated bantustans within the OPT, controlled and separated through a system of checkpoints, settlements, and the wall. For many, their only contact with the outside world comes in the form of visitors, whom the eagerly invite into their homes to exchange stories over glasses of chai ma khalib.
The organization I work for every day is the Majilis Tishriyya, or the Palestinian Legislative Council. It was created as a part of the Oslo process, during which institutions were built within Palestine supposedly in preparation for the creation of a Palestinian state. When the democratic process was opened, partially in response to the demands of the Roadmap which aimed at the time to limit the immense power of Arafat in order to punish him for his impudence at Camp David, allowing the first truly pluralistic parliamentary elections in 2006, the results were shocking. Not wanting to legitimize the Oslo process which they opposed by running in the first elections in 1996, Hamas boycotted them. In 2005, in order to prepare for Hamas to enter the Parliamentary system, Fatah, Hamas, and other parliamentary blocks met in Cairo, reaching the “Cairo Agreement,” which lead to the creation and implementation of the electoral law. No one, Hamas included, expected the tremendous outpouring of support they received at the polls in the 2006 elections, taking 74 out of the 132 seats in the parliament, plus an additional three which were independent candidates who ran on the Hamas “Change and Reform List.” While the history is far too long to recount here, Fatah, the US, and Israel erected a series of obstacles in an attempt to block Hamas from assuming a strong leadership role in the PA, eventually leading to the war between the factions and the fateful break between the West Bank and Gaza in 2007.
Meanwhile, Israel has arrested and imprisoned all but two of the members of the Hamas parliamentary block, leaving the PLC without a quorum and thus unable to function in any real sense. The President, Abu Mazen, directly funded by the United States during the embargo after the Hamas victory, has assumed all legislative authority in the West Bank. Thus, the primary goal of the PLC now is two-fold. First, there have been a series of meetings and conferences to figure out a way in which the PLC can still function with only Fatah and the other parliamentary blocks; some ideas include establishing a limited oversight role on the authority of the President, rearranging the committees and establishing them as an oversight unit, and the most extreme, changing the rules for parliamentary procedure regarding the quorum requirement, so the body could fully reestablish its legislative function, essentially through one-party rule. The second main function of the PLC is, mundanely enough, day-to-day operations such as staff management, planning delegations, and preparing receptions. Visiting dignitaries often find it important to visit the PLC or meet with some of its members. These activities, while monotonous, play an important role in gaining international support for the Palestinian cause and helping to build the pressure on Israel to respect the human rights of the Palestinians and end the occupation.
While working at the PLC, my main goal is to conduct research on the internal political crisis between Hamas and Fatah, given the tremendous access to primary sources and officials I will have while here. I purchased a tape recorder from downtown Ramallah, which I use to keep a record of my interviews to be transcribed later. I am developing a thesis in my head, which I am loosely exploring through my contact with both officials and average people, regarding the connection between the Oslo peace process and the current crisis in Palestinian politics. It seems to me that to a large extent the Hamas movement derives much support from its rejection of the hugely unpopular series of agreements, while the conditions placed on Hamas for reentry into the political system revolve around “respecting the agreements signed by the PLO.” If I am able to get enough material, I am considering using this idea for my Master's thesis. If need be, I could take a second trip to Palestine and use the contacts and leads obtained during this trip to get a head start, and end up with a much more successful project.
But to me this trip is about more than just academics and research; it is also about my growth as a person. I am learning every day what it is like to live in a place without many of the things which I take for granted in the US, such as political representation and freedom of movement, even a viable state to serve as an expression of inherent national interests. It has been a tremendously humanizing experience, reminding me of the lives of others outside our privileged bubble in the US and Europe, but it has also been intensely shocking and incredibly difficult. Being exposed to the wall, the settlements, the disgusting racism of Israeli government policy and the blind hatred which can come out of nowhere has been strenuous and at times startling. A bouncer at the West Jerusalem nightclub “Fusion” refused entry to my two arab friends because he “felt like it.” The wall, the theft of land and resources, the oppression, the destruction of a whole society, culture and people leads me to take a hard look at humanity and ask “how can we do this to one another?” What drives people to treat others in such a way? What sort of legacy are these power-hungry leaders leaving for our children? Have they totally given up on the world?
The work environment itself is great. I immediately became friends with a number of my co-workers, who have a huge variety of religious beliefs, lifestyles, values, and political views. One friend of mine, Rabi, was not allowed to leave Ramallah for 17 years while he waited for his Palestinian ID after moving from Syria. During that time, he got married and had a child. When he was finally able to return home 2 weeks ago for the first time in 17 years, his aging and ill father was able to meet his wife and now ten-year-old son. The other person I work closely with is Iyad, a bright Master's student who, under other circumstances, I would say has a promising future. He speaks four languages, has a sharp intellect and an incredible awareness of world affairs, and is a very hard worker. Yet he has been marginalized by the massive corruption within the Fatah party, demoted two positions with the appointment of a new Secretary-General who instated two levels of authority above him from among his coterie. These men, complains Iyad, have no credentials, no knowledge of what they are doing. The only thing they know is Ibrahim (the new Sec-Gen).
Sometimes, after the PLC has closed and we are walking out together, Iyad opens up to me and tells me that all he really wants to do is get away from Palestine, away from the conflict, or at least away from the PLC. What he really wants to do, he says, is go to the states to get his PhD, to take 5 years and get out of the West Bank. He shows me printouts of the various programs he is looking at, discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each. In the end, he always tells me, his choice will be limited to whichever place is willing to give him a full scholarship, as there is no other way he could afford another degree. His passion, restrained only by his circumstances which he is determined to overcome, is a daily inspiration to me.
Each day, I arrive at the PLC at 8:00 and go to the library until the regular employees begin to arrive at around 9. Each day varies wildly. We are often directed to attend specific committee meetings, or to meet with PLC members and administrators. We have also read many articles to learn about the unique and somewhat bizarre functioning of the PLC. Other days, we help prepare research to be used as background information for the specific needs of other PLC employees. We have been working with (and learning from) Adnan Odrawi in the Parliamentary Research Unit, who is both knowledgeable and friendly. As a result of his tutelage and my own efforts, I think I now know more about the functioning of the PLC than of the US Congress. We have also worked with Rami Yazpak, a special advisor to the Secretary-General, to prepare a detailed timeline of events since 2005 which will presumably be used to assist in reforming the PLC when (and if) reconciliation occurs. Despite such tangible progress, there is a feeling of desperation and exhaustion that never really leaves the building. Most people feel that it is futile to continue working to build an institution for a peace they don't foresee coming to fruition. As Rabi told me, the main concern of the Palestinian people used to be recovering Jerusalem, achieving a state, and their national rights. Now, they care about getting food, and being able to provide for their family's basic needs. The collapse of the momentum of the Oslo process, however false it was in the first place, has had a serious effect on the outlook of the people in the Parliament. Many people work there not because they see it as the future of Palestine, but because it pays. They work toward a Palestinian state without enthusiasm, belief or hope, simply because there is nothing else to do. And all of them know they are losing the war.
The organization I work for every day is the Majilis Tishriyya, or the Palestinian Legislative Council. It was created as a part of the Oslo process, during which institutions were built within Palestine supposedly in preparation for the creation of a Palestinian state. When the democratic process was opened, partially in response to the demands of the Roadmap which aimed at the time to limit the immense power of Arafat in order to punish him for his impudence at Camp David, allowing the first truly pluralistic parliamentary elections in 2006, the results were shocking. Not wanting to legitimize the Oslo process which they opposed by running in the first elections in 1996, Hamas boycotted them. In 2005, in order to prepare for Hamas to enter the Parliamentary system, Fatah, Hamas, and other parliamentary blocks met in Cairo, reaching the “Cairo Agreement,” which lead to the creation and implementation of the electoral law. No one, Hamas included, expected the tremendous outpouring of support they received at the polls in the 2006 elections, taking 74 out of the 132 seats in the parliament, plus an additional three which were independent candidates who ran on the Hamas “Change and Reform List.” While the history is far too long to recount here, Fatah, the US, and Israel erected a series of obstacles in an attempt to block Hamas from assuming a strong leadership role in the PA, eventually leading to the war between the factions and the fateful break between the West Bank and Gaza in 2007.
Meanwhile, Israel has arrested and imprisoned all but two of the members of the Hamas parliamentary block, leaving the PLC without a quorum and thus unable to function in any real sense. The President, Abu Mazen, directly funded by the United States during the embargo after the Hamas victory, has assumed all legislative authority in the West Bank. Thus, the primary goal of the PLC now is two-fold. First, there have been a series of meetings and conferences to figure out a way in which the PLC can still function with only Fatah and the other parliamentary blocks; some ideas include establishing a limited oversight role on the authority of the President, rearranging the committees and establishing them as an oversight unit, and the most extreme, changing the rules for parliamentary procedure regarding the quorum requirement, so the body could fully reestablish its legislative function, essentially through one-party rule. The second main function of the PLC is, mundanely enough, day-to-day operations such as staff management, planning delegations, and preparing receptions. Visiting dignitaries often find it important to visit the PLC or meet with some of its members. These activities, while monotonous, play an important role in gaining international support for the Palestinian cause and helping to build the pressure on Israel to respect the human rights of the Palestinians and end the occupation.
While working at the PLC, my main goal is to conduct research on the internal political crisis between Hamas and Fatah, given the tremendous access to primary sources and officials I will have while here. I purchased a tape recorder from downtown Ramallah, which I use to keep a record of my interviews to be transcribed later. I am developing a thesis in my head, which I am loosely exploring through my contact with both officials and average people, regarding the connection between the Oslo peace process and the current crisis in Palestinian politics. It seems to me that to a large extent the Hamas movement derives much support from its rejection of the hugely unpopular series of agreements, while the conditions placed on Hamas for reentry into the political system revolve around “respecting the agreements signed by the PLO.” If I am able to get enough material, I am considering using this idea for my Master's thesis. If need be, I could take a second trip to Palestine and use the contacts and leads obtained during this trip to get a head start, and end up with a much more successful project.
But to me this trip is about more than just academics and research; it is also about my growth as a person. I am learning every day what it is like to live in a place without many of the things which I take for granted in the US, such as political representation and freedom of movement, even a viable state to serve as an expression of inherent national interests. It has been a tremendously humanizing experience, reminding me of the lives of others outside our privileged bubble in the US and Europe, but it has also been intensely shocking and incredibly difficult. Being exposed to the wall, the settlements, the disgusting racism of Israeli government policy and the blind hatred which can come out of nowhere has been strenuous and at times startling. A bouncer at the West Jerusalem nightclub “Fusion” refused entry to my two arab friends because he “felt like it.” The wall, the theft of land and resources, the oppression, the destruction of a whole society, culture and people leads me to take a hard look at humanity and ask “how can we do this to one another?” What drives people to treat others in such a way? What sort of legacy are these power-hungry leaders leaving for our children? Have they totally given up on the world?
The work environment itself is great. I immediately became friends with a number of my co-workers, who have a huge variety of religious beliefs, lifestyles, values, and political views. One friend of mine, Rabi, was not allowed to leave Ramallah for 17 years while he waited for his Palestinian ID after moving from Syria. During that time, he got married and had a child. When he was finally able to return home 2 weeks ago for the first time in 17 years, his aging and ill father was able to meet his wife and now ten-year-old son. The other person I work closely with is Iyad, a bright Master's student who, under other circumstances, I would say has a promising future. He speaks four languages, has a sharp intellect and an incredible awareness of world affairs, and is a very hard worker. Yet he has been marginalized by the massive corruption within the Fatah party, demoted two positions with the appointment of a new Secretary-General who instated two levels of authority above him from among his coterie. These men, complains Iyad, have no credentials, no knowledge of what they are doing. The only thing they know is Ibrahim (the new Sec-Gen).
Sometimes, after the PLC has closed and we are walking out together, Iyad opens up to me and tells me that all he really wants to do is get away from Palestine, away from the conflict, or at least away from the PLC. What he really wants to do, he says, is go to the states to get his PhD, to take 5 years and get out of the West Bank. He shows me printouts of the various programs he is looking at, discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each. In the end, he always tells me, his choice will be limited to whichever place is willing to give him a full scholarship, as there is no other way he could afford another degree. His passion, restrained only by his circumstances which he is determined to overcome, is a daily inspiration to me.
Each day, I arrive at the PLC at 8:00 and go to the library until the regular employees begin to arrive at around 9. Each day varies wildly. We are often directed to attend specific committee meetings, or to meet with PLC members and administrators. We have also read many articles to learn about the unique and somewhat bizarre functioning of the PLC. Other days, we help prepare research to be used as background information for the specific needs of other PLC employees. We have been working with (and learning from) Adnan Odrawi in the Parliamentary Research Unit, who is both knowledgeable and friendly. As a result of his tutelage and my own efforts, I think I now know more about the functioning of the PLC than of the US Congress. We have also worked with Rami Yazpak, a special advisor to the Secretary-General, to prepare a detailed timeline of events since 2005 which will presumably be used to assist in reforming the PLC when (and if) reconciliation occurs. Despite such tangible progress, there is a feeling of desperation and exhaustion that never really leaves the building. Most people feel that it is futile to continue working to build an institution for a peace they don't foresee coming to fruition. As Rabi told me, the main concern of the Palestinian people used to be recovering Jerusalem, achieving a state, and their national rights. Now, they care about getting food, and being able to provide for their family's basic needs. The collapse of the momentum of the Oslo process, however false it was in the first place, has had a serious effect on the outlook of the people in the Parliament. Many people work there not because they see it as the future of Palestine, but because it pays. They work toward a Palestinian state without enthusiasm, belief or hope, simply because there is nothing else to do. And all of them know they are losing the war.
Settler Violence
Here in the West Bank, settler violence has reached new heights. The rabid right-wing fanaticism of the ideological settlers, allowed to act with total impunity against Palestinians, from whom they are protected by the IDF, has created a dangerous environment for many Arabs living and working in their territory.
Below is a report from Rabbis for Human Rights, a group that deals with a wide variety of human rights issues, on the recent murder of a Palestinian boy by settlers.
Eyewitness report: Funeral of 17 year old student attacked by same Israeli soldiers who killed him
30.06.08 - 00:23
Hebron / Bekah Wolf - The Israeli military has been slowly escalating its intimidation tactics in Beit Ommar over the last three days, often patrolling the streets at sundown, provoking youth by parking outside of the mosque and waiting for young boys to come and throw stones before shooting tear gas and rubber-coated steel bullets.
The increasing terrorization of the village culminated at approximately 9:30 pm Friday when a 17 year old boy, Mohammed Anwar Al-Alami, was shot in the heart and killed.
Soldiers first entered the southern West Bank's town at 4 pm and began slowly circling the village, often stopping in the center of town, shooting a few tear gas canisters, but otherwise staying in their jeeps. They were not searching houses nor made any other indication that they were engaging in any authorized operation. Shortly after sundown, at approximately 9 pm, they began arresting residents: blindfolding and handcuffing nine men in total and bringing them to the entrance of the village. Four were later released, five remain in Israeli custody. Several more jeeps and Armored Personnel Carriers (APC's) entered the village. Young boys began throwing stones and empty bottles which bounced off the armored military vehicles harmlessly. Still, for the Israeli military a rock against reinforced metal is reason enough to end the life of a young man, about to finish his final exams and graduate from high school.
Mohammed was quickly rushed to the hospital, but he had been shot in the chest and the bullet entered his heart, killing him almost instantly.
When international activists approached the soldiers one was thrown to the ground and his camera was stolen from him. Another observer with the Christian Peacemaker Teams, who was on crutches, was also knocked to the ground by the commander of the Israeli forces. The video tape and memory cards of the cameras of the CPT activists were all taken, erasing evidence of the assault on them presumably in an attempt to cover-up the egregiously excessive violence used by the Israeli army against young people.
On Saturday at 10:30 am international and Palestinian activists with CPT and Palestine Solidarity Project joined the community as they took the body from the hospital in Hebron and drove in the funeral procession back to Beit Ommar. The long line of cars with Palestinian and political faction flags hanging out the windows was soon accompanied by two Israeli military jeeps. Not given a moment to grieve, the Israeli military soon brought in reinforcements and gathered a mass of jeeps and soldiers near the cemetery.
After a visit to the murdered student's home and the mosque, the entire village, several thousand people, marched down the main road to the cemetery. The soldiers, not wanting to allow the participants to use the main entrance of the cemetery, ostensibly because of its proximity to their reinforced concrete watchtower that looms over the entrance to the village, parked two jeeps on the main road, cutting off the residents and forcing them to a side road leading to the back entrance to the cemetery. Community leaders, trying to prevent a confrontation with the soldiers, managed to persuade most of the procession on to the side road; approximately 50 or so, however, were insistent on their right to approach where their dead are laid to rest from the front entrance.
These men walked past the parked jeeps and gathered at the entrance to the cemetery as well as gathering on the roof of a house across the street from the watchtower. It was at that time that the same commander who oversaw the killing of the boy the night before got out of his jeep. The member of the Christian Peacemakers Team who had been pushed to the ground the night before approached the soldiers with a video camera, reminding the commander that the CPT member was now a witness to the funeral of the boy his unit had killed the night before and demanding that he, a Palestinian-American, and other Palestinians, be treated with the dignity they deserve. The soldiers soon began pushing the crowd back towards the cemetery and threw a sound grenade, effectively disrupting not only the crowd, but the family's moment to mourn the death of a young man.
Residents soon returned to their homes while young men, many of whom were fellow students of Mohammed's, began to throw stones at the armored jeeps. The soldiers, rather than leaving the village which would have both eliminated the source of tension and allowed the community to mourn properly, instead decided they had not 'taught their lesson' well enough and again invaded the village. This time, at least two were injured: one young boy was hit with a ricochet in the head, and another was light injured when his arm was grazed by a bullet.
Members of PSP and CPT again went out into the street to document. Although they were less than 50 meters away and clearly visible to the soldiers, they also had to soon take cover as live ammunition, rather than "crowd-dispersal weaponry" such as tear gas or rubber-coated steel bullets which are less lethal, went whizzing past their heads. And so it continued that lethal force, when less lethal means were well at their disposal (though some of the soldiers were outfitted with plastic-coated steel bullets which are against international law) was used against stone-throwing children and international activists. It is this low-level war—the murder of a child here and there, the unending expansion of Israeli settlements and theft of Palestinian land—that is ongoing in the West Bank; less obvious, perhaps, than the brutal attacks on Gaza, but no less devastating.
Below is a report from Rabbis for Human Rights, a group that deals with a wide variety of human rights issues, on the recent murder of a Palestinian boy by settlers.
Eyewitness report: Funeral of 17 year old student attacked by same Israeli soldiers who killed him
30.06.08 - 00:23
Hebron / Bekah Wolf - The Israeli military has been slowly escalating its intimidation tactics in Beit Ommar over the last three days, often patrolling the streets at sundown, provoking youth by parking outside of the mosque and waiting for young boys to come and throw stones before shooting tear gas and rubber-coated steel bullets.
The increasing terrorization of the village culminated at approximately 9:30 pm Friday when a 17 year old boy, Mohammed Anwar Al-Alami, was shot in the heart and killed.
Soldiers first entered the southern West Bank's town at 4 pm and began slowly circling the village, often stopping in the center of town, shooting a few tear gas canisters, but otherwise staying in their jeeps. They were not searching houses nor made any other indication that they were engaging in any authorized operation. Shortly after sundown, at approximately 9 pm, they began arresting residents: blindfolding and handcuffing nine men in total and bringing them to the entrance of the village. Four were later released, five remain in Israeli custody. Several more jeeps and Armored Personnel Carriers (APC's) entered the village. Young boys began throwing stones and empty bottles which bounced off the armored military vehicles harmlessly. Still, for the Israeli military a rock against reinforced metal is reason enough to end the life of a young man, about to finish his final exams and graduate from high school.
Mohammed was quickly rushed to the hospital, but he had been shot in the chest and the bullet entered his heart, killing him almost instantly.
When international activists approached the soldiers one was thrown to the ground and his camera was stolen from him. Another observer with the Christian Peacemaker Teams, who was on crutches, was also knocked to the ground by the commander of the Israeli forces. The video tape and memory cards of the cameras of the CPT activists were all taken, erasing evidence of the assault on them presumably in an attempt to cover-up the egregiously excessive violence used by the Israeli army against young people.
On Saturday at 10:30 am international and Palestinian activists with CPT and Palestine Solidarity Project joined the community as they took the body from the hospital in Hebron and drove in the funeral procession back to Beit Ommar. The long line of cars with Palestinian and political faction flags hanging out the windows was soon accompanied by two Israeli military jeeps. Not given a moment to grieve, the Israeli military soon brought in reinforcements and gathered a mass of jeeps and soldiers near the cemetery.
After a visit to the murdered student's home and the mosque, the entire village, several thousand people, marched down the main road to the cemetery. The soldiers, not wanting to allow the participants to use the main entrance of the cemetery, ostensibly because of its proximity to their reinforced concrete watchtower that looms over the entrance to the village, parked two jeeps on the main road, cutting off the residents and forcing them to a side road leading to the back entrance to the cemetery. Community leaders, trying to prevent a confrontation with the soldiers, managed to persuade most of the procession on to the side road; approximately 50 or so, however, were insistent on their right to approach where their dead are laid to rest from the front entrance.
These men walked past the parked jeeps and gathered at the entrance to the cemetery as well as gathering on the roof of a house across the street from the watchtower. It was at that time that the same commander who oversaw the killing of the boy the night before got out of his jeep. The member of the Christian Peacemakers Team who had been pushed to the ground the night before approached the soldiers with a video camera, reminding the commander that the CPT member was now a witness to the funeral of the boy his unit had killed the night before and demanding that he, a Palestinian-American, and other Palestinians, be treated with the dignity they deserve. The soldiers soon began pushing the crowd back towards the cemetery and threw a sound grenade, effectively disrupting not only the crowd, but the family's moment to mourn the death of a young man.
Residents soon returned to their homes while young men, many of whom were fellow students of Mohammed's, began to throw stones at the armored jeeps. The soldiers, rather than leaving the village which would have both eliminated the source of tension and allowed the community to mourn properly, instead decided they had not 'taught their lesson' well enough and again invaded the village. This time, at least two were injured: one young boy was hit with a ricochet in the head, and another was light injured when his arm was grazed by a bullet.
Members of PSP and CPT again went out into the street to document. Although they were less than 50 meters away and clearly visible to the soldiers, they also had to soon take cover as live ammunition, rather than "crowd-dispersal weaponry" such as tear gas or rubber-coated steel bullets which are less lethal, went whizzing past their heads. And so it continued that lethal force, when less lethal means were well at their disposal (though some of the soldiers were outfitted with plastic-coated steel bullets which are against international law) was used against stone-throwing children and international activists. It is this low-level war—the murder of a child here and there, the unending expansion of Israeli settlements and theft of Palestinian land—that is ongoing in the West Bank; less obvious, perhaps, than the brutal attacks on Gaza, but no less devastating.
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